Merilaita 2009
). If nothing has been detected because the visual system fails to differentiate object versus background, then presumably there is no perception of the shape of the object, because the viewer is unaware of that object's existence. A further example is distractive camouflage. Kelley and Kelley outline work testing whether distractive markings draw the viewer's eye to high-contrast nonmarginal markings, thus preventing the observer from detecting the body outline. However, as normally described, this does not seem to constitute an illusion because it refocuses gaze or attention toward one object feature at the expense of another by manipulating attention, although Kelley and Kelley's work may challenge us to think more carefully about how distractive features may work.
It is also not clear whether traits that manipulate receiver behavior or overstimulate/inactivate receiver responses should be examples of illusions. Clearly, there is likely to be a continuum and so pigeon-holing can be artificial, but it is important to be clear in order to carefully guide future work. For example, if the circular eyespots found on many animals that Kelley and Kelley discuss do mimic eyes (although supporting evidence is currently lacking; Stevens and Ruxton 2014), should they and other types of mimicry be considered as illusions? I argue that mimicry would usually not constitute an illusion because it involves a direct resemblance to another object, and this is not the same as distorting perspective or creating the impression of something that is not really there.
The above debates matter because if we are to understand communication and signals we need to comprehend the mechanisms by which they work. The issue of what is an illusion is not simple because perception is something quite specific to the sensory systems and brains of each animal. At the moment, more behavioral experiments are needed to demonstrate that other species really do perceive illusions, especially of more naturalistic stimuli. Kelley and Kelley's (2014) definition seems sensible and a good start in determining which traits are illusions.
Finally, as Kelley and Kelley (2014) point out, arrangements of color and brightness can affect the perception of color patches adjacent to one another. We need to pay more attention to the composite arrangement of animal and plant markings, rather than focusing on individual elements in isolation. Studies of communication and signaling commonly analyze the color of a single patch and correlate this with some aspect of behavior and then infer what information the receiver may have extracted. Yet, if signal color patches operate synergistically, then this approach could misinterpret the information available and underestimate the efficacy of the signal. In short, we need to consider the 2D and 3D properties of animal signals, and studies of the strategic aspects of signaling need to more commonly consider issues of signal efficacy and multicomponent communication. In conspicuous signals, for example, we would expect adjacent color patches that stimulate different opponent color channels or sets of receptors (such as 
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Ecology and Biodiversity Management, UMR 7179, Muséum National d'Histoire Naturelle-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 4 avenue du petit chateau, 91800 Brunoy, France Kelley and Kelley (2014) provide a highly original and stimulating review, particularly interesting when speaking about animal illusion. This concept is indeed rarely reported or discussed in the recent literature, with the exception of studies of forced perspective in Great Bowerbirds by John Endler and collaborators (Endler et al. 2010; Kelley and Endler 2012) . However, maybe except for this latter case, examples of illusion given in the review are often speculative because presumed illusions, even if measured physically or mathematically, have not been demonstrated to be perceived as so by the receivers. Are they really illusions, effects that act to distort the perception of the viewer as defined by Kelley and Kelley (2014) , or more simply optimization of signal efficacy?
One may wonder if the concept of illusion is different from the exploitation of perceptual biases developed by Schaefer and Ruxton (2009) , which also considers sensory, neuronal, and higher cognitive processes involved in the evolution of traits of the sender that exploit perceptual biases of the receiver? Maybe not, even if this model has mainly been used to explain deception by mimicry, it can also be applied to the examples of illusions advanced by Kelley and Kelley (2014) . The concept of animal illusions is within the range of sensory exploitation, bias, and traps. However, those have mainly been used in the study of female preferences and mate choice, whereas illusions in their present broad sense also encompass nonsexually selected traits like disruptive coloration, countershading, distractive markings, or motion dazzle. This concept, to my opinion, could even be extended to several other cases and sensory modalities, for example, from aggressive mimicry of bolas spiders which create the illusion of presence of female moths by mimicking their pheromones to prey on males (Stowe et al. 1987) , to aggressive mimicry of katydids which create the illusion of receptive female presence by mimicking their wing sounds to capture males (Marshall and Hill 2009) or even to orchids which attract pollinators by visual and olfactory illusions of food, mates, and oviposition sites (Jersakova et al. 2006; Gaskett 2011) .
Using the term illusion brings a focus on the neuronal, psychological, and cognitive processes implicated in visual perception of naturally and sexually selected traits, which are rarely considered in nonhuman communication. This approach will certainly contribute to significant advances in the field, like the recent work of motion dazzle studied on locust neurons by Santer (2013) . The whole concept also has the interest to feed the raging debate on the existence of art production and aesthetic sense in animals (Endler et al. 2010 , see also http://plato.stanford.edu/art-definition/).
